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Abstract  
Sources of claims in climate change litigation may easily be identified under substantive public international 
law. However, when it comes to following procedure that should result in realising such a claim, the process is a 
frustrating one for potential litigants. The issue of state responsibility in public international law has to be 
balanced against the sovereign right of a state to conduct itself in any way it pleases within its own territory. This 
is added to the fact that the current structure of international law is replete with a number of obstacles that may 
prevent victims of climate change impact from obtaining justice against greenhouse gas emitters. Thus, the 
current structure of international law makes it unlikely for victims of climate change to find justice through 
international dimensions. International dimensions in this paper denote all procedures designed to help victims of 
climate change impact challenge greenhouse gas emitters, regardless of whether the proceedings will produce a 
legally binding decision or not. Striking the right balance would require litigants to be able to make claims 
before an international tribunal that possesses the jurisdiction to entertain claims against states and other non-
state entities. This article identifies such forums and analyzes its effectiveness in litigating claims against states 
that fail to comply with policies and measures that seek to mitigate climate change, such as reducing greenhouse 
gas emission. While such mechanisms exist, their effectiveness in dealing with violators may be unsuccessful, 
thus the need to set out an international liability scheme for claims in climate change litigation where claims for 
loss and damage are in issue. 
Key words: climate change litigation; claims under climate change; public international law; international 
liability scheme; loss and damage.  
1.0. Introduction 
Public international law is traditionally known as a system of rules and principles that govern the relationship 
between States and other subjects of international law. The complexity of international law and the necessity to 
preserve an effective and progressive international society has warranted the acknowledgement of other entities 
as possessing some degree of international personality provided they are able to enter into legal relation and 
exercise some rights in the international arena. To this end, Verma 1  expresses that States, international 
organizations and other non-State entities, together with individuals in certain situations, are the subjects of the 
international legal system. Nonetheless, the State remains the dominant actor in international climate change law 
and the principal architect of federal policies. 
The issue of climate change and the liability schemes arising thereto belong to the realms of international 
environmental law. International environmental law is a relatively new area of international law. It flows from 
the basic concept of good neighbourliness and on the notion that nations have a duty to cooperate with each other 
as enshrined in Article 1 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation (UNO), 1945 (as amended). Even 
Principle 24 of the Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment, 1972, (the Stockholm Declaration) supports 
the idea that international matters concerning the protection and improvement of the environment should be 
handled in a co-operative spirit by all countries, big or small, on an equal footing. One of the most basic 
prescriptive rules and the backbone of international environmental law is the principle that States have an 
                                                          
1
 S. K. Verma: An Introduction to Public International Law (New Delhi: PHI Learning Pvt Ltd, 2004), 69. 
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obligation not to cause or allow environmental harm outside their borders. It is based on the time-honoured 
common law principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.1 According to Nanda and Pring,2 this is a deeply 
rooted principle in the world’s cultures, from the Christian “Golden Rule" (Do for others what you want them to 
do for you”) 3  to the Confucian Principle of Shu (“Do not impose upon others what you do not want for 
yourself”).4  
It should be noted that the State-centred nature of the modern world exacerbates our environmental problems and 
is the major reason for the inadequacy of international environmental law and institutions. Since the end of the 
Second World War and the establishment of newly independent States, the development of international law has 
been governed by the principle that all States recognised under international law are regarded as both sovereign 
and equal in their relations with each other. It is based on this premise that David Hunter expressed that “there is 
a fundamental tension between a State’s interest in protecting its independence (i.e. its sovereignty) and the 
recognition that regional and global environmental problems require international cooperation.”5 This is more 
pronounced in such matters such as carbon emission reduction in the face of rampaging impacts of climate 
change.  
The implementation of the main thrusts6 of the Kyoto Protocol (the Protocol) in 1997 demonstrates the difficulty 
of organizing an effective international response to mitigate climate change impacts. The events leading up to the 
Protocol began at the World Conference on Environment and Development.7 The Conference was held in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992 where States signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the 
Convention).8 But the Convention was not legally binding as it did set mandatory limits on greenhouse gas 
emission for individual countries, neither did it contain any enforcement mechanisms. In 1997, the Protocol to 
the Convention was adopted in Kyoto, Japan. The Protocol imposed concrete obligations on States to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions during the first commitment period, 2008-2012.9 However, the worst emitters are 
either not signatories to the Protocol or do not have an obligation to reduce emissions.10  Since the Protocol’s 
emissions-reduction standards were too lax to effectively combat climate change, Small Island States also made 
declarations that the ratification of the Protocol shall in no way constitute a renunciation of any rights under 
international law concerning State responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change.11 With this, the Small 
Island States made it clear that they did not believe that the emissions reductions in the Protocol were sufficient 
to prevent the dangerous interference of activities within States with the climate system.  
The main thesis of this paper is that the current structure of international law makes it unlikely for claims for loss 
and damage due to climate change impact to find justice through international dimensions. The reason being that 
current structure of international law is replete with a number of obstacles on the way to victims obtaining justice 
against greenhouse gas emitters. As a way out we are of the view that establishing an international liability 
scheme on climate change will help the victims obtain justice that they desired.  
2.0. Potential Liability Schemes for Climate Change Litigation  
General international law provides some opportunities for advancing climate change litigation. The problem 
however is whether greenhouse gas emitting nations or companies can be held liable for the impacts generated 
by their own emissions, given that nearly every person on earth contributes in some way or the other to emission 
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 One should use one’s own property so as not to injure another. 
2
 V. P. Nanda and G. Pring: International Environmental Law & Policy for the 21st Century (New York: Transnational 
Publishers, Inc., 2003), 20. 
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 Matthew 7: 12; Luke 6: 31, The Good News Bible with Deuterocanonical Books. 
4
 T. R. Reid: “Confucius Lives Next Door: What living in the East Teaches Us about Living in the West” 112 (1999) in V. 
Nanda and G. Pring, ibid, 18. 
5
 David Hunter et al, “International Environmental Law and Policy” 326 (1998) in Nanda and Pring, ibid, 18 
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 Such as carbon emission reduction , clean development and joint implementation mechanisms 
7
 Timo Koivurova, “International Legal Avenues to Address the Plight of Victims of Climate Change: Problems 
and Prospects”  Journal of Environmental Law & Litigation Vol. 22, 2007, 267-299], 272 
8
 An International Multi-lateral Environmental Agreement setting forth general obligations on nation-states to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation to its consequences. 
9
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ibid 
10
 For instance, the United States of America (USA), a high emitter of greenhouse gases, has not signed the Protocol. Again, 
China and India who are presently among the highest emitters of greenhouse gases have no reduction commitments as they 
are not included as Annex 1 countries in the Protocol. See P. Kingsnorth, “The Four Degrees,” available at 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n20/paul-kingsnorth/the-four-degrees (last assessed on April 23, 2015). 
11Timo Koivurova, ibid, 274 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.40, 2016 
 
31 
of greenhouse gases. This is worsened by the fact that total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have 
continued to increase despite a growing number of climate change mitigation policies.1  
According to the Synthesis report (Fifth Assessment Report) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC),2 “warming of the climate system is unequivocal. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amount 
of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen.” The report further stated that continued emission of 
greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system, 
increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems.3 A recent 
report of the Nature Conservancy states that one-fourth of the Earth’s species could be headed for extinction by 
2050.4 The IPCC Report also projected that coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea level rise 
which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized.5  
As a result of the attendant effects of climate change, and the difficulties in arriving at a consensus by the 
international community in loss and damage the question is: what are the potential liability schemes for climate 
change litigation under international environmental law? 
1. A potential international liability scheme may be established under the Principle of State Responsibility or No-
Harm Rule, a principle of customary international law. State liability under this principle is premised that a 
breach of an international obligation derived from international treaty or customary law by a State, committed 
through an act or omission, may lead to liability by that State. This can be also be applied in relation to liabilities 
arising from a climate change induced litigation. But how can this principle be applied? 
Under the principle, a State is duty-bound to prevent, reduce and control the risk of environmental harm to other 
States.6 Such a State shall so be held liable in the event of occurrence of any environmental harm to individuals 
within the State or to others outside the State, if the harm occurs extra territorially. The position has been 
confirmed by different decisions of international courts and tribunals. The legal precedent usually cited in this 
connection is the case of Trail Smelter Arbitration7 which concerns a Canadian smelter whose sulphur dioxide 
emissions had caused air pollution damages across the border in the United States of America (USA). The 
arbitral tribunal in that case determined that the government of Canada had to pay the USA compensation for 
damage that the smelter had caused primarily to land along the Columbia River valley in the USA. The tribunal 
concluded that there is an international principle that “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury in or harm to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury established by clear and convincing evidence.”  
In another situation, the International Court of Justice in 1996, in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion8 stated 
that the court recognises that the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of 
life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn. It went on to state that there is an 
obligation on States to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other 
States. The court a year later in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam case9 affirmed this decision and added that 
safeguarding the ecological balance has come to be considered an essential interest of all States. In the Island of 
Palmas case,10 the sole Arbitrator, Huber, who was the president of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
stated that, “territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a state. This right has 
as corollary duty; the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other States.” 
This obligation by a State to protect within its territory the rights of other States has found support in climate 
                                                          
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers” 
available at  http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf (last assessed June 20, 2015) 
2
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ibid, 3 
3Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, op cit, 8  
4 The Nature Conservancy, “Climate Change Threats and Impacts”, (n.d.) available at 
http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/urgentissues/global-warming-climate-change/threats-impacts/, assessed on June 20, 2015 
5
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, op cit , 13 
6
 P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell: International Law and the Environment, 3rd edn., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 143 
7
 Trail Smelter Arbitration: United States v Canada (1931–1941) 3 UNRIAA, vol. III 
8
 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, (July 8, 1996), 29, U.N. Doc. A/51/218, 35 
I.L.M. 809 91996) 
9
 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) September 25, 1997, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 53  
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 Island of Palmas case (United States v. The Netherlands), 2 RIAA (1949) 
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change litigation in the case of Urgenda Foundation c. s. v The Kingdom of the Netherlands.1 The main demand 
of Urgenda is that the Dutch state is acting unlawfully by not contributing its proportional share to preventing a 
global warming of more than 2 degrees Celsius. They sought a declaration from the court that global warming of 
more than 2 degrees Celsius will lead to a violation of fundamental human rights worldwide. They also sought 
from the court, an order that the Dutch State drastically, and no later than 2020, reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions coming from within the boundaries of the Netherlands, to the level that has been determined by 
scientists to be in line with less than 2 degrees Celsius of global warming. This will involve a reduction of CO2 
emissions by 40% by 2020 below 1990 levels with the aim of preventing the risk of dangerous climate change, 
or at least of reducing this risk.  
The court in its judgement ordered the Dutch state to limit annual greenhouse gas emissions from the country to 
25% below 1990 levels by 2020. The government had pledged a 17% reduction, but the court found that 
insufficient. The court undertook a detailed examination of reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, the United Nations Environment Programme, and various Dutch Institutions, and concluded that the 
mandated 25% reduction was the level needed to meet the country's fair contribution toward the UN goal of 
keeping global temperature increases within 2 degrees Celsius of pre-industrial conditions. It further held that 
due to the severity of the consequences of climate change and the great risk of hazardous climate change 
occurring, the State has a duty of care to take mitigation measures. The court in reaching at its decision cited, 
without directly applying, a number of legal documents, viz: Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution,2 the emissions 
reduction targets of the European Union, principles under the European Convention on Human Rights, the "no 
harm" principle of international law, the doctrine of hazardous negligence, the principle of fairness, the 
precautionary principle generally, and the sustainability principle embedded in the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, and the principle of a high protection level, the precautionary principle, and the prevention 
principle embedded in the European climate policy.  
This is the first decision by any court in the world ordering states to limit greenhouse gas emissions for reasons 
other than statutory mandates.3 The Urgenda case was also the first attempt outside the United States to bring 
these theories before a court in the climate change context. In another contest, on April 29, 2015, the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court handed down judgement in favour of the Appellants in R (o.a.o. Client Earth) v 
Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,4 bringing to an end the sequence of proceedings 
that arose out of ‘the admitted and continuing’ failure of the United Kingdom since 2010 to secure compliance in 
certain zones with the limits for nitrogen dioxide levels set by European Union law.5 Whereas, the UK case was 
a judicial review of the actions in implementing the Directive, the Urgenda case was a judicial review of the 
State’s obligations to its citizens in relation to the impact of global warming. 
The acceptance of the principle in preventing, reducing and controlling the risk of environmental harm to other 
States has also found expression and incorporated in a number of international treaties and policy documents. 
For instance, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, 1972, provides as follows: 
States have in accordance with the charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that the activities within 
their jurisdiction or the control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. 
Similarly, the principle has been codified in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, 1992 (Rio Declaration).  
                                                          
1
 Urgenda Foundation c. s. v. The Kingdom of the Netherlands and Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment [2015] 
Case C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, decided on June 24, 2015. 
2
 The Article provides as follows: “It shall be the concern of the authorities to keep the country habitable and to protect and 
improve the environment.” 
3Such as the Clean Air Act of USA, 1990. 
4
 [2015] UKSC, 281 
5
 Under Directive 2008/50/EC 
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In analysing the import of the provisions of these legal documents, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 
and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, we are in total agreement with Nanda and Pring.1  According to them, the 
first clause2 pays deference to the State sovereignty doctrine while the second clause3 creates a large exception to 
the clause, proclaiming that sovereignty does not shield States from responsibility for the adverse effects of their 
actions on environments outside their territory. Thus, even though a state has the sovereign right to use and 
exploit all resources on its territory, the right to pollute is however not without boundaries. These boundaries 
flow from the principle that no state has the right to use (or have used) the resources on its territory in a way that 
causes damages to other states as applied in the Island of Palma’s case,4 where the court stated that “territorial 
sovereignty, as has already been said, involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a State. This right 
has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other States.”  
It is devastating to note that the IPCC projected that even if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are 
stopped, many aspects of climate change and associated impacts will continue for centuries, and that the risk of 
abrupt or irreversible changes increases as the magnitude of the warming increases.5 The parties negotiating the 
Convention on Climate Change knew that climate change would continue despite the general measures laid out 
in it. Early in the negotiations, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) attempted to include an article in the 
Convention that would have implemented a specific standard of state responsibility.6  Even though the question 
of state responsibility was still an issue during the fifth negotiating round in New York, it was fully deleted from 
the final Convention text due to objections from industrialised countries. Many Small Island States responded to 
this omission by making official declarations to the Convention. For example, Tuvalu, alongside Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati (who made similar declaration) stated upon its signing of the 
Convention that: 
The Government of Tuvalu declares its understanding that 
signature of the Convention shall in no way constitute a 
renunciation of any rights under international law concerning state 
responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change, and that 
no provisions in the Convention can be interpreted as derogating 
from the principles of general international law.7  
All four states, but particularly Tuvalu, are frequently cited as the first victims, and among the most viable 
plaintiffs, of climate change. For example, Tuvalu is quickly becoming uninhabitable, as much of its 
infrastructure has been destroyed by rising seas, coastal erosion, and unusually strong storms. Emigration may 
soon be the only viable option for the island’s inhabitants.8 Thus, as a result of climate change many countries 
may already be able to show a certain degree of harm. However, the actual occurrence of harm is not a 
precondition for a violation of the no-harm rule. It is sufficient for a victim to show that a State’s conduct will 
cause significant damage for its responsibility to be engaged. Therefore, the no-harm rule is not only a general 
obligation to prevent significant trans-boundary harm, but also to minimise the risk of such harm.9 
2. Beside the No harm rule, liability scheme may be based on recognised international law theory of due 
diligence. The theory of due diligence requires states to ensure that they cause no damage to the environment of 
other states. At one stage of the United Nations International Law Commission’s (ILC) project on state 
responsibility, an argument for the inclusion of state responsibility was made. Draft Article 19, paragraph 3, 
provides that: 
Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of 
international law in force, an international crime may result, inter 
alia, from . . . (d) a serious breach of an international obligation of 
                                                          
1
 V. Nanda and G. Pring, op cit, 18 
2
 The sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies 
3
 The responsibility to ensure that the activities within their jurisdiction or the control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 
4
 (1928), II UNRIAA 829, at 839. 
5
 Op cit, 16 
6
 Timo Koivurova, ibid, 274 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 R. S. Tol & R. Verheyen, “Liability and Compensation for Climate Change Damages – A Legal and Economic 
Assessment,” 32 ENERGY POLICY 1109 (2004) 
9
 Trail Smelter Arbitration: United States v Canada (1931–1941) 3 UNRIAA, vol. III 
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essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the 
human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution 
of the atmosphere or of the seas.1 
3. In addition, we take the view that state responsibility under the liability scheme may be anchored on the 
‘principle of preventive action.’ This principle seeks to minimize environmental damage as an objective in itself. 
It prohibits activity which causes or may cause damage to the environment in violation of the standards 
established under the rules of international law. It has been described by Kramer2 as being  
of overriding importance in every effective environmental policy, 
since it allows action to be taken to protect the environment at an 
earlier stage. It is no longer primarily a question of repairing 
damage after it has occurred.  
Under the principle, a state should be under an obligation to prevent damage to the environment within its own 
jurisdiction, including by means of appropriate regulatory, administrative and other measures. This requires 
states to action an early stage and, if possible, before damage has actually occurred. For instance in the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case,3 the ICJ noted that; 
it was mindful that, in the field of environmental protection, 
vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often 
irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the 
limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this 
type of damage.4 
It should be noted that this principle has also been endorsed, directly or indirectly by some Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements.5 As also found a place in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. 
For example, Principle 11, which requires states to enact “effective environmental legislation;” Principle 14 calls 
on states “to prevent the relocation and transfer to other states of hazardous activities or substances” and 
Principle 15 that specifically provides for precautionary approach by states in environmental matters.  
Furthermore, the principle has been endorsed by a large number of international environmental treaties, aiming 
to prevent, inter alia: the spread of occupational disease, including radioactive contamination of workers;6 
pollution of the seas by oil,7 hazardous waste and substances,8 from land-based sources or from any source;9 
radioactive pollution of the atmosphere;10 hostile environmental modification; adverse effects of activities that 
prevent the migration of species;11 air pollution;12 modification of the ozone layer;13 degradation of the natural 
environment; significant adverse environmental impacts and trans-boundary impacts generally; 14  dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system;15 loss of fisheries16  and other biodiversity,17 including as a 
result of the release of genetically modified organisms;18 and damage to health and the environment from 
                                                          
1
 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (Part 2) 
2L. Kramer, EEC Treaty and Environmental Protection (1990).www.eu.org/env, accessed on September 10, 
2014. 
3
 Hungary v. Slovakia (1997) ICJ Reports 7 
4
 (1997) ICJ Reports 7 at 78, paragraph 140. 
5For instance, Principles 6, 7, 15, 18 and 24, Stockholm Declaration, 1972, Principle 1UNEP Draft Principles, 
1978 and the World Charter for Nature, 1982       
6
 Article 3(1) Ionising Radiation Convention, 1960. 
7
 Preamble to the Oil Pollution Prevention Convention, 1969 
8
 Article 1 (1) MARPOL 73/78 
9
 Article 194 (1) UNCLOS, 1982 
10
 Article 1(1) Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, 1963. 
11
 Article 111 (4) (b) Bonn Convention, 1979 
12
 Article 2 Long Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), 1979 
13
 Article 2(2) (b) Vienna Convention, 1985 
14
 Preamble to the Espoo Convention, 1991 
15
 Article 2 Climate Change Convention, 1992 
16
 Straddling Stocks Agreement, 1995 
17
 Preamble and article 1 Biodiversity Convention, 1992. 
18
 Article 1 Biosafety Protocol to the Biodiversity Convention, 2000 
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chemicals and persistent organic pollutants.1 More significantly for the development of precautionary principle 
as an international legal principle is the fact that it has been relied upon in dealing with activities affecting 
environmental media and in relation to trans-boundary resources by the awards in the Trial Smelter2 case and 
Lac Lanoux Arbitration.3  
Arising from all the positions stated above, where a State4 in the course of exercising its sovereign right to 
exploit its own resources pursuant to its own environmental policies, neglects due diligence or failed to apply the 
principle of preventive action, such a State has the responsibility to ensure that the activities within its 
jurisdiction or under its control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the 
limits of its national jurisdiction. If any harm occurs outside its jurisdiction that State should be held responsible 
for such harm. To this end, a State’s liability to victims of climate change may arise where a state’s deliberate 
unwillingness to reduce its considerable greenhouse gas emissions would seem to qualify as massive pollution of 
the atmosphere, especially because the effects of climate change are both substantial and longstanding.  
The essence of this preposition is that humanity is called to recognize the need for changes of lifestyle, 
production and consumption habits, in order to combat global warming and climate change or at least the human 
causes which produce or aggravate them. This is premised on the assumption that where a State allows its 
territorial to be used in creating or producing or operating potentially dangerous substances that are capable of 
causing or have caused irreversible environmental damage resulting to loss and/or damage to life and property, 
such State should owe the victims an absolute and non-delegable duty with the highest standards of safety to 
ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of these actions. If any harm results the State should be strictly 
liable to bear for the loss or damage arising thereto, irrespective of the jurisdiction of impact or harm.   
3.0. Where Can a Victim Ventilate his Claims?  
The damages caused by climate change concern virtually every aspect of life. Greenhouse gas emitters may 
damage the marine environment, the biodiversity of nature, or international trade, all of which are protected by 
international rules and regulations. The international avenues available for climate change litigation are the 
means by which climate change claims can be brought forward. In this context, it involves both the relevant 
treaties5 upon which the claims can be brought and the forum6 in which they are entertained.  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 7  and its Protocol, the Kyoto 
Protocol, form the foundation for the international climate change regime. The preamble of the UNFCCC 
emphasises that the no-harm rule forms part of the international law surrounding climate change, and continues 
to govern the relationship between parties to the Convention.8 Article 2 of the UNFCCC provides that the 
ultimate objective of the Convention (and any related legal instruments that the Conference of Parties may 
adopt) is:  
to achieve… stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be 
achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to 
                                                          
1
 Article 1 Persistent Organic Pollutant Convention 2001 
2
 Supra 
3
 12 RIAA 285, (Spain v. France). Here the arbitral tribunal affirmed that a state has an obligation not to exercise 
its rights to the extent of ignoring the rights of another. 
4
 For our purpose, State in this context means not only a country or nation with its own sovereign independent 
government, but also refers to the country's government and those government-controlled institutions that are 
responsible for its internal administration and its relationships with other countries. It also, by implication, 
includes all entities that operate within it, such as state-owned companies or any other company, which is 
registered under its Laws for the time being in force in that State. 
 
5
 For instance, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement. 
6
 Such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Tribunal on Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the World 
Trade Organization (WTO)  
7
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107 
8
 UNFCCC, Preamble, recital 8 
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adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production 
is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed 
in a sustainable manner. 
This provision, according to Kilinski,1 represents the purpose of the UNFCCC particularly in the realm of 
customary international law. Moreover, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Treaties, a signatory State 
which fails to ratify a convention is still under an obligation not to frustrate the object and purpose of a treaty to 
which it is not a signatory. Thus, it could be argued that those countries that failed in their domestic policy to 
refrain from frustrating the purposes outlined in the text of the UNFCCC are open to liability. This, of course, is 
highly contentious as most view this section as non-binding and aspirational in nature.2 
Again, Article 4 (2) of the UNFCCC requires industrial nations to commit to lowering, by the year 2000, 
greenhouse gases within their borders to the level emitted in 1990. The question becomes whether these sections 
are sufficient enough to maintain an action in liability for those countries that are parties to the UNFCCC.3 
Although these provisions appear to be too vague, Kilinski, however opines that it may be different in situations 
where a country commits to both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol,4 as the latter provides very specific 
requirements for reducing greenhouse gases, with quantifiable measurements on certain dates.5  This is because 
the Protocol in its Article 3(1) mandates Annex I countries to, individually or jointly, meet their assigned 
emissions criteria, and thus, where there is a clear obligation, failure to comply could be seen as a breach of an 
express treaty obligation.  
Also, Article 14 (5) of the UNFCCC provides procedures for a conciliation which would permit a state to 
“legally” investigate whether a causal link existed between climate change harms in their state and the climate 
policy implemented in another country, and then, based on the undertaken investigation, request issuance of a 
non-binding recommendation by the Compliance Committee.6 The Committee handles breaches of obligations 
set forth in the Protocol.  
Although the Compliance Committee has extensive authority, particularly in its enforcement division, it is 
unlikely that victims of climate change would present to it their legal demands. This assertion is based on two 
reasons. First, the worst greenhouse emitters remain outside the Protocol to reduce their emissions. Second, the 
Compliance Committee only investigates whether parties to the Kyoto Protocol are observing their obligations. 
The Committee has no authority generally to investigate claims for compensation for damages due to impact of 
climate change or indeed impose sanctions against countries that fail to fulfil their obligations under the 
Convention. 
Apart from the above obstacle, it is well known that the differences between developed and developing countries 
create some tension when climate change issues are being discussed. A fundamental aspect of the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol is the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ among industrialised and 
developing countries.  Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development has provisions on 
this principle in these words: 
States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to 
conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the 
Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, states have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of 
sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies 
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place on the global environmental and of the technologies and 
financial resources they command.1 
In practical terms, the application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility has at least two 
consequences. First, it entitles, or many require, all concerned states to participate in international response 
measures aimed at addressing environmental problems. Secondly, it leads to environmental standards which 
impose differing obligations on states. The principle has two elements. The first concerns the common 
responsibility of states for the protection of the environment, or parts of it, at the national, regional and global 
levels. The second concerns the need to take account of differing circumstances, particularly in relation to each 
state’s contribution to the creation of a particular environmental problem and its ability to prevent, reduce and 
control the threat. 
Inspite of these tenets of the principle, when it comes to establishing meaningful mitigating targets for emission 
reductions, the UN Climate Change Summits have not been as successful as it would have been hoped given that 
countries such as India, China, and the United States refused legally binding targets at the 2011 meeting in 
Durban, South Africa (where the Kyoto Protocol was extended for another five years at least). The outcome of 
such refusal is that other countries would not in the future be unwilling to accept any targets being placed on 
them. 
Thus, international action under the UNFCCC must be guided by the best available science. Increasingly 
frequent and progressively more severe impacts of climate change make the need for urgent action abundantly 
clear. This is underscored by a growing number of reports,2 which have also provided options and solutions for 
the world to act effectively now to prevent much more serious climate change in the future.  
Another avenue that can be explored by the victims is the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.  The 
Court Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and has been described as the guardian of the 
international legal community as a whole.3 It may hear contentious disputes concerning an alleged breach of an 
international obligation if (and to the extent) the States concerned have accepted its jurisdiction. Given the 
widely accepted principles of State sovereignty, jurisdiction is ultimately based on State consent.4 A State may 
accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction in three different ways.5  
First, under acceptance by a unilateral declaration, Article 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ provides that a state 
may elect prospectively to accept ICJ compulsory jurisdiction. The problem with this option is that few major 
emitters accepted compulsory jurisdiction. For example, the United States withdrew its acceptance after the ICJ 
ruled against it in a case brought by Nicaragua in the 1980s.6 Secondly, the ICJ can attain jurisdiction if the 
involved states mutually consent to the Court’s authority.7 The likelihood that a potential defendant under 
climate change litigation would submit to the ICJ is however, slim to none. It is hard, according to Kilinski,8 to 
imagine a scenario where the United States, China, India, or some other nations would voluntarily subject 
themselves to an international court system’s determination of liability on such a contentious issue. However, the 
most likely avenue for the ICJ to obtain jurisdiction is through Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute.9 It requires the 
parties to specifically agree through treaty provisions to submit to the ICJ for dispute resolution.10 
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 Several limitations exist when bringing a claim against the major GHG emitters through the ICJ. First, 
jurisdiction must be acquired over the case through one of the mentioned mechanisms as States tend to refuse the 
ICJ’s jurisdiction in cases that reflects significant interest.1 Also, the causes of action must be well pleaded and 
the plaintiff must also obtain standing.2  
As a result of all these difficulties, one may be tempted to ask: what options may be available to victims of 
climate change impacts. As a way out of this potential logjam, victims of climate change impact may “bypass” 
the ICJ’s jurisdictional consent requirement by attempting to obtain an advisory opinion from the ICJ. This 
approach involves convincing the United Nations (UN) bodies to ask the ICJ to issue an advisory opinion in 
order to clarify state responsibility regarding climate change.3 The ICJ is authorized to give an advisory opinion 
on almost any legal problem, provided that the request is made in accordance with Article 96 of the UN Charter. 
The request has to be made by the UN General Assembly, Security Council, or other UN organizations. Hence, 
an individual State cannot request an advisory opinion.  
However, a State’s proposal to ask for an advisory opinion must obtain a simple or two-thirds majority in the 
General Assembly depending on the importance of the decision.4 UN organizations can also request advisory 
opinions.5 The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) would qualify as an organization under whose 
mandate climate change issues belong. However, UNEP has not been granted general authorization by the 
General Assembly to request an advisory opinion. The governing council of UNEP would therefore need to ask 
the General Assembly to make this request on its behalf or obtain the General Assembly’s authorization to make 
the request itself.6  
An Advisory opinion from the ICJ would provide much needed direction that would shape current international 
approach on climate change. It would most likely define state obligations and responsibilities for greenhouse gas 
emissions and would carry significant weight coming from the ICJ and most likely increase the international 
awareness for climate change issues.7  
Another avenue that may be available to victims of climate change impacts to seek redress is through the 
instrumentalities of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 19828 and the United 
Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA).9 These are dispute resolution mechanisms and a means to liability. 
Here, the agreements address the rights and duties of States in protection of the marine environment. Article 
287(5) of UNCLOS in particular establishes a comprehensive framework for protecting and preserving the 
marine environment and redress violations of its provisions. That article provides for four options for settling 
disputes over its provisions: (1) the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea; (2) the ICJ; (3) an arbitral tribunal; 
or (4) a special arbitral tribunal.10  
Furthermore, the viability of using these agreements rests on the fact that climate change impacts greatly on the 
oceans. These impacts according to Burns11 range from rising sea level, warming water temperatures to changes 
in ocean pH level.  
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While UNCLOS recognizes the sovereign right of States to exploit their natural resources, this must be done in 
accordance with “their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment” which is enshrined in Articles 192 
and 193 of the UNCLOS. Under the Convention, State parties are required “to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment from any source,”1 including “the release of toxic, harmful or noxious 
substances, especially those that are persistent2 from land-based sources, [or] from or through the atmosphere.”3  
Even Article 212 of the Convention mandates States to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment from or through the atmosphere. States are also required to take “all 
measures necessary” to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction are conducted in a manner that does not 
cause pollution damage to other States and their environment.4 This includes measures to protect and preserve 
“rare or fragile ecosystems” and the habitat of depleted or endangered species and other forms of marine life.5 
State responsibility, and in the same vein likelihood of liability, may therefore be triggered when a State fails to 
fulfil any of or all of the above responsibilities under the Convention. This is so because “States are responsible 
for the fulfilment of their international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment and shall be liable in accordance with international law.”6 Thus, one could connect greenhouse gas 
emissions, scientifically linked to rising sea levels, increased water temperatures, and changes in ocean pH level, 
and general impairments of the oceans, to increased absorption by oceans of carbon dioxide emitted into the 
atmosphere by the State in question.  
In this regard a potential litigant from Small Island nations or coastal States may invoke the provisions of Article 
197 of UNCLOS7 to compel UNFCCC8 to institute an action against GHG emitters whose activities might have 
impaired the oceans.  This premise is predicated on the facts that: 
a. The UNFCCC should clearly be construed as the “competent organization” to address 
climate change under Article 197 of UNCLOS.  
b. UNFCCC has been ratified by 189 nations, including all of the world’s major 
greenhouse gas emitting States.9  
c. The obligations under UNFCCC should be recognized as “international mechanisms 
to control pollution” under Article 212 of UNCLOS. The reason being that the overarching purpose 
of UNFCCC is to control greenhouse gas emissions so as to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”10  
d. Under Article 235 of UNCLOS, the UNFCCC (as a Convention) is clearly an 
international obligation that can contribute to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
Using UNCLOS may have its limitations. An immediate limitation is the United States’ failure to ratify it. Thus, 
a suit against the USA may not necessarily succeed if brought under the Convention.11 However, according to 
Kilinski, the environmental provisions arguably already bind the United States, as many aspects of the UNCLOS 
are codifications of customary international law despite its lack of signatory status.12 In fact, the U.S. Federal 
court in the case of Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc13 held that UNCLOS is customary international law, due to its nearly 
universal ratification. Although, some of the means for mandatory arbitration may not be viable against the 
United States per se, they may be utilized against any of the other State parties to the UNCLOS. 
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The United Nations Fishing Stock Agreement (UNFSA) on the other hand presents an additional avenue for 
finding liability. This agreement contains a binding dispute resolution procedure,1 but unlike the UNCLOS, the 
United States largely follows it.2 Though it does not make an explicit reference to pollution or emissions, one 
plausible argument is that the commercial fisheries’ sectors are adversely impacted by climate change and these 
impacts fall upon many of the fish stocks directly regulated under the UNFSA.3 
4.0. What Proofs are required to sustain a Claim?  
Where a State4 in the course of exercising its sovereign right to exploit its own resources pursuant to its own 
environmental policies, neglects due diligence or failed to apply the principle of preventive action, such a State, 
as we had stated earlier, has the responsibility to ensure that the activities within its jurisdiction or under its 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of its national 
jurisdiction. If any harm occurs outside its jurisdiction that State should be held responsible for such harm. The 
question is; how can a victim claiming for loss and/or damage, a resultant consequence of such harm, pursue 
such claim against the State?  
Due to the rigorous routes available to a potential litigant, a way out of the logjam may be for the claimant to 
hold that the State that caused the emission of greenhouse gas (GHG), or under whose watch permitted the 
emission of GHG emission “caused” and/or “knowingly permitted” the emission of the substances that caused 
global warming and the resultant climate change that led to the loss and/or damage.   
The word ‘cause’ lays down an offence of strict liability. This is because the word is not conditioned by any 
requirement of knowledge. In applying this in prosecuting emission of GHG what the litigant needed to establish 
is that the State carried out series of activities that gave rise to climate change and the loss and/or damage being 
complained of. Once it can be shown that the emission was not regulated or that emission is regulated but the 
emitter failed to apply due diligence, all that is necessary to prove liability is to establish a link between the 
defendant’s activities and the emission of GHG, for example that the defendant uses fossil fuel. The test 
therefore is that ‘causing’ must involve some active operation or chain of operations involving the defendant 
resulting in the emission and the harm complained off. This test was applied in the case of Alphacell Ltd v 
Woodward.5 In that case the defendant, a paper manufacturing company, was charged with causing the escape of 
polluting matters into a river. Settling tanks in the paper factory overflowed, when vegetation clogged up the 
pumps which maintained the level of effluent in the tanks. The tanks filled up and overflowed causing polluting 
matter to enter the river. An overflow channel led directly from the tanks to the river. The defendant claimed it 
did not cause polluting matter to enter the river rather presence of vegetation in the settling tank was the real 
cause of the incident. The court held that the act of constructing and operating the effluent tank was a positive 
and deliberate act which led to the overflow which caused the pollution. According to Lord Wilberforce, 
 …the appellants abstract water, pass it through their works where 
it becomes polluted, conduct it to a settling tank communicating 
directly with the stream, into which the polluted will inevitably 
flow if the level rises over the flowing point.    
Under this situation, the scope of liability of the defendant was his involvement in the operations or chain of 
events. Thus, in the case of CPC (UK) Ltd v National Rivers Authority,6 a factory operator was held to have 
caused polluting matter to enter a stream when a pipe carrying cleaning fluid fractured, allowing the fluid to flow 
into a river via a storm drain. Though the cause of the fracture was a defective work carried out by 
subcontractors for the previous owner, which was not exposed by environmental audit. The court still held the 
current owners liable.  
There are however limits to the applicability of the concept of causing pollution. Where it can be shown that the 
defendant had no active involvement in the chain of events that led to the polluting incident, he will not be liable. 
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That is, he had been passive.1 In the case of Price v Cromack,2 a farmer had a contract permitting an animal firm 
to discharge waste into lagoons on his land. One lagoon wall failed and the resulting escape severely polluted a 
river. The farmer was charged with polluting the river. He was acquitted on the grounds that he only permitted 
the accumulation and had not caused the pollution. Again, in the case of Wychavon District Council v National 
Rivers Authority3 raw sewage escaped from a sewer under the control of appellant Council acting as agent of the 
water company in maintaining and repairing the sewerage system. The immediate cause of the escape was a 
blockage in the sewer. The court held that the Council was not guilty of causing the pollution since it had mainly 
remained inactive.  
While ‘cause’ imports element of strict liability, ‘knowingly permit’ on the other hand involves knowledge 
requirement. It has two arms: ‘knowingly’ and ‘permitting.’ The essence of the ‘knowingly permit’ is designed 
to catch the offender who knows that emission of GHG is occurring, has the power to do something about it, for 
example, complying with emission reduction requirements, and yet does nothing. In other words, the defendant 
must be aware of the emission incident. This is because a party must know about a problem before it can be 
guilty of failing to take reasonable steps to correct it.  
The case of Price v Cromack4 provides a useful illustration of the difference between the ‘causing’ offence and 
the offence of ‘knowingly permit.’ In that case a farmer was charged with ‘causing’ pollution when a lagoon on 
his land failed and waste animal products were released into a river. The farmer had a contract with an animal 
product firm which allowed the firm to discharge animal waste products into the lagoons on the farmer’s land. 
The farmer was acquitted of ‘causing’ charge on the basis that he had not caused the pollution. Whilst he had 
permitted the accumulation of the waste on his land, he could not be said to have caused the pollution. Had he 
been charged with ‘knowingly’ permitting pollution, then the verdict would probably have been different. The 
basis for this being that he had knowingly permitted the accumulation of the waste on his land and should be 
aware that such accumulation is capable of causing harm if it escapes. 
In the case of ‘permitting,’ its meaning depends upon the context under which it is being considered. It could be 
confined to mean ‘allow,’ or ‘authorise’ or it could carry the wider meaning of failure to take reasonable steps to 
prevent the occurrence of that which should not be permitted.5 In the case of Berton v Alliance Economic 
Investment Co. Ltd,6 it was held that ‘permitting’ may mean either giving leave for an act which, without that 
leave, could not legally be done, or to abstain from taking reasonable steps to prevent an act, where it is within a 
person’s power to do so.  
The bottom line however, is that for a defendant to be liable for permitting a polluting incident such a defendant 
must be in control.  Such a defendant may not be a director or a senior manager. What is needed is that such a 
person can be said to constitute the mind of the company. To this end, we hold that knowledge of the emission or 
emitting activity need not be by the director or a senior manager, or of such a standing, provided the person is of 
such a standing or had acquired some knowledge about the emission and has some power to make relevant 
decisions. The case of Shanks & McEwan (Teeside) Ltd v. Environment Agency7 is supportive. In that case in a 
prosecution for an illegal deposit of waste, the court held a company in the business of accepting waste to have 
corporate knowledge in respect of a specific illegal deposit when it was accepted by a site supervisor in the 
absence of the site manager.    
5.0. Conclusion 
Once a victim can convincingly show that a State is responsible for the violation of a primary international legal 
obligation, having caused or knowingly permitted the emission of GHG which caused him loss and/or damage. 
This position is corollary to the CoP18.8   
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At the Conference, it was established for the first time that rich nations should move towards compensating poor 
nations for losses due to climate change.1 This was contained in the proposed Loss and Damage mechanism. 
This mechanism was placed under an existing process in which the US promised to mobilise $100bn a year for 
poor nations to adapt to climate change. Before now developed nations have agreed to help developing countries 
financially to get clean energy and adapt to climate change, but they have stopped short of accepting 
responsibility for damage caused by climate change elsewhere. But in Doha that broad principle was agreed 
upon. Developing nations hailed it as a breakthrough, but condemned the gulf between the science of climate 
change and political attempts to tackle it. The Island States accepted the agreement because for them it is better 
than nothing.2 "What helped swing it, according to Roger Harrabin,3 was US President Barack Obama asking 
Congress for $60bn for the damage caused by Hurricane Sandy."   
However, this agreement did not go without some politicking where national interests prevailed over collective 
global interest. For instance, the UK Climate Secretary, Ed Davey, posited; "we haven't agreed to set up a new 
institution - and there's no blank cheque, but there is clearly an issue if, say, an island state is lost underwater."4 
Reacting to this assertion by UK Climate Secretary, the spokesman of Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 
Ronald Jumeau from Seychelles, condemned wealthy countries for their lack of urgency. He said that there 
would be no need for talk about compensation if the rich had cut their emissions in previous meetings. He 
posited further at a joint news conference in Doha:  
The Doha caravan seems to be lost in the sand. As far as ambition 
is concerned, we are lost. We're past the mitigation (emissions 
cuts) and adaptation eras. We're now right into the era of loss and 
damage. What's next after that? Destruction? Disappearance of 
some of our islands? We're already into the era of re-location. But 
after loss and damage there will be mass re-locations if we 
continue with this loss of ambition.5 
Arising from the position of AOSIS, and the urgency involved in mitigating climate change, we are of the 
opinion that the best way to fast track emission reduction, and thereby abating climate change, is through 
litigating loss and damage.   
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